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Huge changes were brought about by the collapse of the Central Powers and 
the armistice agreements that followed it in the national borderlines in Europe, 
which consequently also led to the birth of a few new states. The victorious 
countries dictated the terms of the peace treaties which were based mainly on 
the principle of War Guilt. Answering the question “who should be responsi-
ble for the outbreak of the war”, the winners put the burden of all responsibil-
ity on the shoulders of the defeated countries. However, this conclusion was 
misleading and generalising. It does not live up to the high standards of objec-
tive judgement. It is entirely driven by the logic of the rule that history is writ-
ten by the victors. In fact, the real reasons behind the outbreak of the war must 
be viewed in the context of a complicated and interdependent network of prob-
lems with many shades and layers. For example: The aggressive imperialist 
vision of Greater Serbia, the domestic weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, the nationalistic expansion of Romania, Russia’s long held desire to 
expand along a Pan-Slavic route, the shrinking French influence since the loss 
of Franco-Prussian war and their hopes that a new war might restore it, the 
British Empire’s worries about Germany’s growing hegemony on the continent 
and naval power on the seas, and the German fears about total isolation in a 
crisis. All these considerations reduced the chances for a peaceful outcome and 
any attempts that had been made to reach one, had already been too late and 
had remained ineffective due to the quick mobilisation of the armies. 
Despite the above observations, punitive peace treaties were made and jus-
tified by the idea that the state alone is responsible for the war and for its con-
sequences (the War Guilt Clause). This applied to all defeated countries but not 
in equal terms. The greatest loss that Austria had to endure as one of the suc-
cessor countries of the Dual Monarchy (10th September,1919, Treaty of Saint-
Germain) was to give South Tyrol, Trieste and Istria to Italy and to let Dalmatia 
become part of the new South Slavic state. The terms of the Treaty signed by 
Hungary (4th June 1920, Treaty of Trianon), another successor country of the 
Dual Monarchy, therefore, a guilty one, forced her to endure the loss of 2/3 of 
her territory and 1/3 of her Hungarian population. She was so harshly pun-
ished that the body of the country was effectively chopped up. 
The way the losers were treated after the war was also shaped by the vic-
tor’s desire to consolidate the bourgeois establishment in Europe. They wanted 
to save the world from the dangers of Bolshevism and wanted to redraw the 




possible way to deal with revolutionary Russia, it seemed, was to block her by 
a quarantine made out of anti-communist countries (Cordon Sanitaire). Since 
most lands to make these new countries were taken from Russia, their anti-
Moscow sentiment was guaranteed. The list of these countries in a north-to-
south order comprises Finland, previously an autonomous land, whose inde-
pendence was guaranteed by Lenin, the three small Baltic countries, who did 
not have any historical predecessor, Poland, who managed to gain her inde-
pendence back after a period of 120 years of foreign rule, and Romania, who 
grew twice as big as her original state at an astounding speed mainly through 
annexing the land torn off from Hungary plus ex-Russian Bessarabia. Besides, 
the Cordon Sanitaire included other states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
The European map had to be redrawn for the purposes of containing Ger-
many, too, and for the enabling the Allied Powers to meet their obligations 
they had made towards Romania, Serbia, and the Czechs in their mutual secret 
treaties. The collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires 
had left a vast geographical vacuum behind in Europe and the Middle East, 
which needed to be filled up quickly to serve the best interests of the new or-
der. This new situation mainly favoured the various nationalistic movements, 
which were all going to pose as the heirs to these vacated lands, even more so 
because they had the backing of the main powers who had supported them in 
the hope of finishing the war in a quicker and a more successful manner by the 
military help they could offer in return. This allowed them to be more econom-
ical with their war effort, which protected their human and material resources, 
and as a bonus these new countries were, by their nature, anti-Bolshevik, and 
anti-German. 
The idea of creating pure nation states along ethnic and language bounda-
ries was one of the original principles behind the redrawing of the borders. 
President Wilson was the main protagonist of this idea. Unfortunately, this is 
exactly where the biggest failure had occurred in the “Peace” terms. It is even 
more intriguing to see that in the whole of human history it had hardly ever 
happened that a defeated country identified so much with the principles of the 
victors as Hungary did with Wilson’s Principles. The main argument for not 
having invited the losers to the negotiations was their preliminary nature. It 
was simply too early, they had argued, for them to come along, and as a reas-
surance of their goodwill they had promised a place at the final stages of the 
talks. The reality, however, was different: the land-grabbing peace terms that 
would eventually lead to the “Treaty of Trianon” were exclusively discussed 
among the victors. These peace terms heavily limited Hungary’s options to 
function as a normal country, and her opportunities were damaged to a mas-
sive extent. It was the sanctioning of the terms of this land-grabbing peace trea-
ty which made it particularly hard for the losers to accept it, and so it hurt their 
sense of justice and diminished their trust in the rule of law. 
Austria and Hungary were reduced to their pure German and Hungarian 
constituents. Serbia grew bigger to be known as Yugoslavia (which was, in fact, 




Croatia, and the formerly independent Montenegro. The new state of Czecho-
slovakia was created from the Dual Monarchy’s industrial centrum, the Czech 
Lands, joined together with rural Slovakia and the Rusyns’ land, i.e., former 
Upper Hungary. Romania’s nationalistic expansion was crowned by turning 
into a multinational conglomerate. Neither historical precedent nor logic could 
explain the formation of the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and Romanian states. 
They were the embodiment of the nationalistic ideology which believed in the 
power of shared ethnicity and in the idea that too small nation states were un-
desirable. Now, both South and Western Slavs formed multinational states, 
and most of the Romanian speaking areas were grouped together into one 
state. However, this desired outcome could not have been achieved voluntari-
ly; they were often forced and therefore did not stand the test of time. Fur-
thermore, the ratio of ethnic minorities in the post-war countries became great-
er than it had been in Hungary before the war.  
In the name of the different nationalities, the once diversely populated 
lands of Austria and Hungary were divided into six new countries with equal-
ly mixed populations. It created tension that would lead to further conflicts 
which were then further aggravated by the fact that the arrangement of the 
new borders overlooked the general economic interests of the region. Not only 
did this political transformation completely ignore the national, geographical, 
and economic conditions of this area but it also lacked any understanding of 
local history. Therefore, along with the geographical peculiarities, they stood 
for a kind of intellectual and material energy that were quite independent from 
the facts and figures.  
The new borders of 1919 did not solve the problems of nationalities. If any-
thing, they made it worse. Out of the 40 million people in Europe who be-
longed to any of the ethnic minority groups, the most lived in Central Europe. 
Out of the twelve countries in the region, two became just like the Monarchy, 
only on a smaller scale: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and 
Czechoslovakia. Out of the many minorities of the South Slavic state, the Serbs 
only accounted for 40% of the entire population, the Croats for 23%, the Slo-
venes for 8%, Bosnians for 6% and the Macedonians for 5%. Furthermore, more 
than half a million Hungarians and the same number of Germans lived in the 
Kingdom, and there were also Italians, Romanians, and other Slavic minorities.  
Not only did the Peace Treaty offer Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina up on a dish to Serbia but a significant part of South Hungary 
was offered to them as well, along with the Hungarian and German speaking 
majority who had already lived there. Serbia’s total territorial gain was 143,000 
square kilometres which increased the area of the Kingdom to 249,000 square 
kilometres. The Czechoslovak Republic was a brand-new country where seven 
million Czechs and two million Slovaks lived together with a further five mil-
lion people as minorities.  
In effect, the winners plainly restored the Austro-Hungarian Empire only in 
a much more pathetic form. Czechoslovakia’s territorial gain was 140,000 
square kilometres, which entirely came from the Dual Monarchy but the ratio 
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of the Czechs in the new state only reached 51%, and even the Slovak’s share 
did not go any higher than 15%. (The Hungarians in 1910 made up 54.6% of the 
entire population). Neither does Romania meet the requirements to be de-
scribed as a mono-ethnic nation state. They too ended up with having a large 
group of minorities, who accounted for 30% of the population. Romania got 
113,200 square kilometres from the Dual Monarchy and consequently, with 
other territorial gains from Russia, the area of Romania grew from 137,903 
square kilometres to 295,000 square kilometres and the pre-war population of 
7.8 million people became 17.5 million by the 1930s. 
We can see by looking at the figures that out of the 24 minority groups scat-
tered across in Central and Southern Europe, seven had a nation state, while 
the three South Slavic nations, and the Czechs and Slovaks lived in two multi-
national states. Out of the 109 million people who lived in the region, 26 mil-
lion, one quarter of the entire population, belonged to a minority group. 
Among them were the Hungarians, who formed the third biggest minority 
group of all. It’s size, according to the statistics of the successor states of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, almost reached three million. According to the 
Hungarian estimates, it even went over it by a few hundred thousands. Half of 
them lived right next to the borders and the other half were divided between 
the historical region of Transylvania where they were scattered across and 
which was also part of Romania by then, and Szekely Land, where they lived 
as one block of 600,000 Hungarians, the furthest point to the east of Hungary. 
As a former ruling nation, the Hungarians, just like the Germans in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, regarded these events as a complete catastrophe and an unac-
ceptable act of injustice. Most of these people thought about their situation as 
an interregnum, and the Germans were hoping to reunite with either Germany 
or Austria, while the Hungarians were trusting the idea of reuniting with 
Hungary.  
The fact that the Hungarian peasantry did not benefit from the agrarian re-
form which allowed for the reallocation of the Hungarian middle-sized and 
large estates, contributed towards a growing sense of resentment among them.  
The ethnic movements in the successor states were no longer about promot-
ing language, cultural or political rights (as was the case in the Dual Monarchy) 
but they were involved in a serious struggle to survive, since being part of a 
minority group meant the loss of one’s estates and employment, the elimina-
tion of career opportunities, personal harassment, and eviction from one’s 
home. After World War I, a general agrarian reform was conducted across the 
newly established, strong states, the sole purpose of which was to get their 
hands on the estates of the previous landowner class on a nationalistic basis. 
Many of the ex-landowner class had found themselves in an underprivileged 
position.15 million acres of land swapped ownership in Central Europe during 
the agrarian reform after 1918. In Czechoslovakia, the area of the confiscated 
land made up 29% of the total area of the country, while in Romania it was 
20%. Mainly the Hungarian and German landowners fell victim to the agrarian 




proportion of her national wealth in such manner. The overall majority of the 
confiscated lands were allotted to Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs.  
In this study, by “observing the object itself”, our focus was to understand 
what had really happened in the country during those crucial years after 
World War I, and at some of the areas and settlements near the frequented 
spots next to the borders. The wind of military collapse, revolution, and foreign 
occupation had swept through the country which was no longer able to resist 
in merit the very real threats posed by the winners’ military and political pow-
er. This power was shaping the talks at the negotiating tables of the peace con-
ference, where the country’s fate would be decided upon. 
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